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COMMENTS
REAPING THE BENEFITS OF
AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY
THROUGH UNIFORM REGULATION
NATHAN W. ECKLEY*
As the technological gap between developed countries and
developing countries increases, so does the nutritional gap.
Instead of conveniently running out to the local grocery store to
grab a nutritious meal, many malnourished children in developing
countries stand, waiting in long lines at humanitarian aid stations
Despite the research efforts of
for a small bowl of rice.
international organizations' to improve the availability of food
* J.D. Candidate, 2003. B.S. in General Agriculture from The University
of Missouri-Columbia. The author wishes to thank his parents for their
constant encouragement, his editor, April Foreman, for her insightful
assistance during the process, and the entire John Marshall Law Review
Board and Candidates for their editorial help.
Us,
at
About
Harvest,
Future
generally
1. See
http: / I www.futureharvest.org/about/index.shtml (last visited Sept. 27, 2001).

The organization's mission statement is as follows:
[Future Harvest works to] promote awareness and educate the
general public and decision makers about the importance of food
production and the role of agricultural science in meeting the
human and environmental challenges of today and tomorrow, and
build financial support for scientific research and charitable projects
that bring the results of this research to rural communities,
farmers, and their families in the developing countries.
Id.; International Food Policy Research Institute, Mission Statement, at

http:/www.ifpri.org/ (last visited Sept. 27, 2001). The organization's mission
statement is as follows:
[T]o identify and analyze policies for sustainably meeting the food
needs of the developing world. Research at IFPRI concentrates on
economic growth and poverty alleviation in low-income countries,
improvement of the well being of poor people, and sound
management of the natural resource base that supports agriculture.
IFPRI seeks to make its research results available to all those in a
position to use them and to strengthen institutions in developing
countries that conduct research relevant to its mandate.
Id.
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sources, 2 reports from the World Health Organization ("WHO")

continue to document several micronutrient malnutrition
problems throughout the developing world.3 One million of those
young children waiting in line will die.4 Another 250 million
children5 will go blind because of vitamin A deficiency.6
Developing countries could stop much of these premature
deaths and disabilities by introducing genetically modified crops,
which are nutritionally altered to address such deficiencies. For
example, the "golden rice" research project modified rice plants to
produce a grain containing increased levels of beta-carotene, which
the human body will then convert into vitamin A.7 Developing
countries facing vitamin A deficiencies often use rice as a dietary
2. See Future Harvest, Gloomy Outlook for Malnourished Children, News
Release
(Aug.
28,
2001),
at
http:/ /www.futureharvest.org/health/impact-release.shtml (reporting that,
according to a news report from the International Food Policy Research
Institute, without more aggressive measures taken to protect against child
malnutrition, it is likely that progress in this area will slow over the next
twenty years).
3. See generally World Health Organization, Iron Deficiency Anaemia,
Assessment, Prevention, and Control, World Health Organization, (2001), at
http:/ / www.who.int / nut/documents / idaassessmentPrevention-control.pdf
(discussing ways to control iron deficiency); World Health Organization,
MicronutrientDeficiencies in Africa, WHO Intercountry Workshop for National
Programme Managers, Regional Office for Africa in Collaboration with
ICCIDD,
(1998),
at
http: / / www. who.int /nut /documents /
assessment idd monitoring-eliminination.pdf (discussing ways to control
iodine deficiency).
4. See Robert Lee Hotz, Californiaand the West Rice Laced with Vitamin
A Created Nutrition: Scientists Hope to End Deadly Diet Deficiency Among
World's Poor Children, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2000 (reporting "golden rice" was
infused with bacteria genes to increase the vitamin A content in the world's
most common dietary staple, which researchers hope will end a deficiency that
kills one million children per year), available at 2000 WL 2200721.
5. See Guy Gugliotta, Genetics Team Unveils a Strain of 'Golden Rice',
Hous. CHRON., Jan. 14, 2000 (noting that "golden rice" allows a rice plant to
produce beta-carotene that the human body converts to vitamin A, which could
impact over 250 million children worldwide), availableat 2000 WL 4274992
6. See World Health Organization, MicronutrientDeficiencies: Combating
Vitamin A Deficiency, at http://www.who.int/nut/vad.htm (last updated March
13, 2002) (acknowledging that vitamin A deficiency is the leading cause of
blindness among young children in most developing countries); see also World
Health Organization, Blindness and Visual Disability, Fact Sheet No. 144,
(Feb. 1997), at http://www.who.int/inf-fs/en/fact144.html (noting that
vitamin A deficiency often leads to blindness (xerophthalmia) in
approximately 350,000 children per year and additionally, vitamin A
deficiency can cause night blindness among pregnant and lactating women).
7. Hotz, supra note 4; Gugliotta, supra note 5; see also Associated Press,
'Golden Rice' Symbolizes Biotech Clash, THE NEWS & OBSERVER, June 26,
2001 (discussing the clash between supporters who favor "golden rice" for its
ability to help developing nations stave off malnutrition, and critics who
oppose golden rice and genetically modified foods as a food supply health
hazard), available at 2001 WL 3471271.
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staple.
This "golden rice" could help countries combat
malnutrition, saving millions of children each year.
However, genetically modified crops are not without
"Beware 'franken-food ' ° and "franken-corn"1 are
opposition.9
12
common rally cries from consumer groups, environmental groups,
3
and members of the European Union ("E.U.")." Concern about
food safety panics many members of the public, turning them
away from the potential uses of genetically modified products. We
should not allow the panicked few to overshadow the enormous
potential agricultural biotechnology can offer the world.
8. Gugliotta, supra note 5.
9. See generally Paul Elias, New Rice Polarizes Biotech Gathering, CHI.
SUN-TIMES, June 26, 2001 (reporting that the world's largest biotech
conference held in San Diego was met with heavy protesters complaining that
businesses are releasing genetically modified food products without long-term
scientific testing concerning their effects), available at 2001 WL 7235403;
Margery Eagan, Worried Food Will Kill You? Me Neither, B. HERALD, Mar. 28,
2000 (reporting on the Bio 2000 Protest March regarding "mutant tomatoes"
in Boston), available at 2000 WL 4320829; Helen Jung, WTO Notebook-Most
Know What's Going On - But Others ... , SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 1, 1999

(reporting on protests at the World Trade Organization meeting in Seattle),
available at 1999 WL 6302291.
10. See Debra Saunders, Thereafter, A Fearful New World, DENVER POST,
June 28, 2001 (reporting "Frankenfood" protestors at the Biotechnology
Conference in San Diego carried signs that read "Biotech Perverts, Get Out of
Our Genes"), available at 2001 WL 6755756.
11. Troy Goodman, Should You Fear Franken-corn?, (Nov. 10, 2000), at
http://www.cnn.com/2000/foodnews/11/10/starlink/index.html (discussing the
evidence available concerning the genetically modified corn protein Cry9C
discovered in taco shells).
Greenpeace,
Genetic
Engineering,
at
12. See
generally
http:// www.greenpeace.org/-geneng/ (last visited Sept. 27, 2001) (advocating
a stance against genetically engineered food); Center for Food Safety, at
http:!/www.centerforfoodsafety.org/ (last visited Sept. 27, 2001):
Specifically, the five major goals of CFS include: 1. Ensuring the
testing, labeling and regulation of genetically engineered foods; 2.
Preserving strict national organic food standards; 3. Preventing
potential animal and human health crisis caused by food borne
illness-including "mad cow" disease; 4. Preventing the expansion of
food irradiation; and 5. Educating the public on the hazards of

industrial agriculture.
Sierra Club, Genetic Engineering Report, (revised March 2001), available at
http://www.sierraclub.org/ biotech/report.asp. The Sierra Club's Genetic
Engineering Committee ("GEC") was created to investigate ways to mobilize
the strength of Sierra Club, because it is the "largest grassroots environmental
organization in the U.S." Id. Specifically, the GEC researches ways to
educate the public and influence regulatory reform to "protect the natural
environment and human health from the threats posed by the release of
genetically engineered organisms." Id.
13. See Chet Raymo, Modification Partof Balanced Chain, B. GLOBE, Sept.
4, 2001 (observing that planting a genetically modified crop anywhere in
Europe will instantly draw crowds of protestors waving "Frankenfood" signs).
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This Comment explains how proper biotechnology regulation
can help alleviate fears about genetically modified crops. Part I of
this Comment details the liberal approval regulations of
genetically modified crops in the U.S. and the commercial
approach the U.S. has taken. Part II of this Comment details the
strict regulatory approval of the E.U. and the precautionary
approach to which the E.U. adheres. Part III analyzes the two
approaches and how they affect new product approvals and
international trade.
Part IV proposes adoption of a hybrid
regulatory approach that would borrow from both the U.S. and
E.U. regulatory systems to address food safety issues, while still
allowing for timely product approval.
I.

THE UNITED STATES REGULATION: LAX CAPITALISM

In 1986, the U.S. created the Coordinated Framework for
Regulation of Biotechnology ("Framework"). 14 Relying partly on a
recent United States Supreme Court case, 5 the Framework
combined agricultural biotechnology regulation under three
separate agencies: the United States Department of Agriculture
("USDA"), the United States Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA"), and the United States Food and Drug Administration
("FDA"). 6 These three U.S. regulatory agencies use existing
statutes 7 to conform genetically modified organisms ("GMOs") into
a three-agency system. 8 This approach 9 is more product-oriented
14. See Stanley H. Abramson & J. Thomas Carrato, Crop Biotechnology:
The Case for Product Stewardship, 20 VA. ENVTL. L. J. 241, 245 (2001)

(outlining the history and procedures of the Framework and its application in
recent biotechnology approval).
15. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). A researcher developed
a genetically modified bacterium that could metabolize hydrocarbons that
could be beneficial in cleaning up crude-oil spills. Id. at 305. When the
researcher attempted to patent his invention, the Patent and Trademark
Office rejected his claim on the grounds that living organisms could not be
patented. Id. at 306. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed that ruling because
the broad language of the Patent Act was designed to include genetically
modified organisms as patentable subject matter. Id. at 313.
16. See A. Brian Endres, 'GMO': Genetically Modified Organisms or
Gigantic Monetary Obligation?The Liability Schemes for GMO Damage in the
United States and the European Union, 22 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV.

453, 479 (2000) (noting that each agency controls a different aspect of
genetically manufactured organisms ("GMOs") under separate regulations).
17. Abramson & Carrato, supra note 14, at 245. The Court realized that
pre-existing statutes were not drafted with biotechnology in mind; however,
the decisions not to create new statutes was based in part on Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, "in which the Supreme Court upheld the patentability of a
genetically engineered microorganism under the Patent Act originally drafted
by Thomas Jefferson." Id.
18. See Ved P. Nanda, Genetically Modified Food and InternationalLawThe Biosafety Protocol and Regulations in Europe, 28 DENV. J. INT'L L. &

POLVY 235, 244-45 (2000) (discussing the approval process in the USDA).
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20
and driven by economics, as opposed to the more process-oriented
approach that some members of the E.U. and other countries use.2

A. USDA: United States Department of Agriculture Regulations
The Animal Plant and Health Inspection Service, ("APHIS")
of the USDA, has the authority to regulate and approve GMOs
The Plant
under the recently enacted Plant Protection Act.
Protection Act, which is a reorganization of the Federal Plant Pest
Act2' and Plant Quarantine Act, 4 took effect May 24, 2000.20
Companies that develop new GMO plant varieties must submit a
petition to APHIS showing that, based upon field trials, the plant
is safe and poses no risk as a plant pest.2 6 If APHIS determines
that the GMO is not a plant pest, it will then issue a
"determination of non-regulated status."" This means that the
new GMO plant does not fall into a regulated category and
farmers are free to plant the GMO. '
B. FDA: United States Food and DrugAdministration
Regulations
FDA regulatory authority is derived from one Act,2" the

19. Id. at 243.

[According to the U.S. regulatory Framework, four] general
principles apply: (1) existing laws are to regulate biotechnology; (2)
the products of biotechnology and not the process are to be
regulated; (3) the safety of a biotechnology product is to be
determined on a case-by-case basis; and (4) a coordinated effort is to
be undertaken between all the agencies involved in regulating
biotechnology.
Id.
20. See Judy J. Kim, Out of the Lab and into the Field: Harmonization of
Deliberate Release Regulations for Genetically Modified Organisms, 16
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1160, 1160-1207 (1993) (outlining and critiquing various

countries' approaches to regulation). The United States uses pre-existing laws
to regulate the deliberate release of GMOs into the environment while
Denmark and Germany use a process-oriented approach. Id. at 1170. The
process-oriented approach enables a country to create new laws that deal

specifically with a new GMO product as it arises. Id.
21. Nanda, supra note 18, at 243. The process-oriented approach
implements new biotechnology laws to regulate GMO products. Id.
22. 7 U.S.C. §§ 7701-7772 (2002).
23. 7 U.S.C. §§ 150aa-150jj (repealed June 20, 2000).
24. 7 U.S.C. §§ 151-154 (repealed June 20, 2000).
25. Agricultural Risk Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-224, 114 Stat.

454.
26. 7 C.F.R. §§ 340.0-340.9 (2002).
27. 7 C.F.R. § 340.6 (2002).
28. Nanda, supra note 18, at 245.

29. Id.
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Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act ("FFDCA").3 ° The FDA
requires that "new additives in food.., be demonstrated safe
through standard scientific testing before being released into the
open market."3' However, the FDA does not require prior testing
of traditional food crops that have not been significantly modified
or altered."
The FDA characterizes genetically modified food
products that are sufficiently similar to conventional foods as
"generally recognized as safe" ("GRAS").3
Despite the
environmentalist
contention
that
this
determination
is
inadequate, 4 companies producing genetically modified foods do
not need approval from the FDA to introduce such GRAS foods
into the U.S. market,35 and thus they may bypass some expense of
the approval process.
The FDA does, however, issue guidelines to assist companies
that usually consult the FDA before marketing their products.36 If
a new food product raises specific health concerns, the FDA may

30. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-395 (2001).
31. See Nanda, supra note 18, at 245 (outlining the safety standards of the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA)). The FFDCA defines the
term food additive as:

[Any substance the intended use of which results or may
reasonably be expected to result, directly or indirectly, in its
becoming a component or otherwise affecting the characteristics of
any food .... if such substance is not generally recognized, among
experts qualified by scientific training and experience to evaluate its
safety, as having been adequately shown through scientific
procedures . . . to be safe under the conditions of its intended use
21 U.S.C. § 321(s).
32. Nanda, supra note 18, at 245-46.
33. Id. at 246.
34. Alliance for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala, 116 F. Supp. 2d 166, 181 (D. D.C.
2000). Petitioners, a consumer interest group, challenged the FDA Policy
Statement regarding genetically modified foods on six grounds. Id. at 170.
Specifically it alleged the "FDA's presumption that rDNA-developed foods are
GRAS and therefore do not require food additive petition under 21 U.S.C. §
321(s) is arbitrary and capricious." Id. The court refused to accept this
reasoning because it determined that since the determination of GRAS status
is within the "technical expertise" of the' FDA, it couldn't be said that
presumption was arbitrary or capricious. Id. at 177. The court held that the
FDA Statement did not violate the FDCA or FDA regulations and therefore
the court granted the government's motion for summary judgment. Id. at 181.
See also Alicia T. Simpson, Buying and Eating in the Dark: Can the Food and
Drug Administration Require Mandatory Labeling of Genetically Engineered
Foods?, 19 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 225, 242 (2001) (analyzing Alliance for
Bio-Integrity v. Shalala and the consumer concern that sparked the lawsuit).
35. Nanda, supra note 18, at 245-46.
36. FDA, Statement of Policy: Foods Derived From New Plant Varieties, 57
FED. REG. 22,984, 22,984, (May 29, 1992) [hereinafter FDA Statement];
Nanda, supra note 18, at 246.
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require, under the FFDCA, that a corporation perform a premarket review before the FDA will approve the GMO.37
Companies introducing the food product are under a legal
obligation to ensure the food is safe, and as a result can be civilly"
or criminally liable for introducing unsafe foods.39 Additionally,
the FDA has the authority to bar a food's introduction if it does not
believe that the food is safe for the public market."'
C. EPA United States Environmental ProtectionAgency
Regulations
EPA regulatory authority arises from two statutes:' Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act ("FIFRA") 2 and the
Toxic Substances Control Act.'
For example, if a plant has a
characteristic similar to a pesticide, the EPA must then approve
that plant." FIFRA also requires companies to register genetically
modified plants with the EPA if the plants display any pesticidelike characteristics.'
D. U.S. CommercialApproach
The first mainstream commercial use of agricultural
biotechnology was the introduction of the recombinant-DNA and
transgenic crops in the early 1990,s.4 6 Although many of those
37. FDA Statement, 57 Fed Reg. 22,987 - 22,989 (May 29, 1992); Nanda,
supra note 18, at 246.
38. Charles A. Deacon & Emilie K. Paterson, Emerging Trends in
Biotechnology Litigation, 20 REV. LITIG. 589, 590 (2001). As biotechnology
increases, so will litigation. Id. at 590. Biotechnology is vulnerable to
litigation because of its newness, lack of regulatory guidelines, media
sensationalism, and opposition from anti-biotech organizations, and poor

consumer perception.

Id. at 594-603.

The most common biotechnology

liability theories are products liability, including strict liability, negligence
and breach of warranty. Id. at 603-07. In addition, manufacturers of
biotechnology products may be susceptible to alternative liability, market

share liability or enterprise liability. Id. at 608-09. The authors point to three
specific biotechnology lawsuits: the StarLink Corn litigation, the AIDS and
Hemophilia drugs litigation, and the Fen-Phen litigation. Id. at 613-21.
39. FDA Statement, 57 Fed. Reg. at 22,988; Nanda, supra note 18, at 246.
40. Nanda, supra note 18, at 246.
41. Id. at 244. The EPA performs two main regulatory functions: 1) it
'establishes maximum tolerance levels for pesticide residues in foods, [and 2)]
before new microorganisms, which include intergeneric organisms derived

through biotechnology, can be manufactured or imported, the EPA must be
notified in accordance with the Toxic Substances Control Act." Id.
42. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (2002).
43. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (2002).
44. Nanda, supra note 18, at 244. "[The EPA... approve[s] pesticides
derived from...

bioengineered plants that contain Bacillus thuringiensis

("Bt"), which is toxic to certain [corn] pests." Id.
45. Id.
46. Abramson & Carrato, supra note 14, at 243.
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products were met with anti-biotechnology resistance, agricultural
biotechnology has become widespread and is generally
acknowledged by U.S. consumers to be considered safe.47 Since
1990, the U.S. has approved nearly 100 genetically modified
products,' with fifty of these GMOs being plant varieties.49
One example of the negative impact of the U.S.'s liberal
approval is StarLink Corn; a corn variety that contains a
genetically modified protein called Bt Cry9C, which allows the
plant to naturally protect itself from pests. 50 This protein is
similar to a protein found in peanuts, which is a common
allergen.5 The product was approved by all three governmental
agencies (USDA, EPA and FDA), for use in animal feed, but not for
human consumption. 2 Although there was no evidence of a
human allergic reaction, the regulatory agencies attempted to
limit StarLink Corn's risk by confining it to animal consumption
only. 53
Some StarLink Corn was inadvertently mixed with food grade
corn, and when traces of the genetically modified protein were
detected in taco shells, these products were immediately pulled
The resulting class action lawsuit
from grocery store shelves.'
filed by StarLink corn growers cost Aventis, the parent company
47. Mary Lynne Kupchella, Agricultural Biotechnology: Why It Can Save
the Environment and Developing Nations, but May Never Get a Chance, 25
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POLY REV. 721, 731 (2001). Of the millions of acres

planted with GMO crops in 1998, eighty-eight percent were planted in North
America, while only one percent were planted in the E.U. Id. at 732.
48. Prepared Statement of Ambassador David L. Aaron, Under Secretary of
Commerce for International Trade Before the Subcommittee on Trade of the
House Committee on Ways and Means, July 28, 1998, at 1998 WL 12762839.
49. See EU/US: Washington Recoils from Gene Food Fight, EUR. REP., July
28, 1999 (noting the building tension between the rapid approval of fifty plant
variety GMOs in the U.S. while the E.U. continues to lag behind), available at

1999 WL 8306732.
50. See Goodman, supra note 11 (discussing the evidence that the
genetically modified corn protein Cry9C is toxic to the European corn borer, a

common corn pest).
51. See id. (analyzing the similarity between the gene that was spliced into
StarLink Corn and its relative similarity to a common peanut allergen). See
also Peanut Advisory Board, The FactsAbout Food Allergies, (last visited Feb.
2,
2002),
at
http:/ / www.peanutbutterlovers.com/ allergies/ index.html

(warning that a small number of people allergic to the proteins found in
peanut butter are susceptible to severe and potentially fatal anaphylactic
shock).
52. See Goodman, supra note 11 (discussing the approval of StarLink Corn
only for animal consumption although there were no reported cases of human
allergic reactions to the Cry9c protein).

53. Id.
54. See FDA, Recall

and Field Corrections:

Foods-Class I, FDA

Enforcement Report (Nov. 1, 2000), at http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/

enf00666.html#star (recalling products that contained genetically modified
StarLink Corn protein Cry9C).

2002]

Biotechnology ThroughUniformRegulation

and licensor of StarLink Corn, several million dollars."5 Currently,
Aventis is still defending lawsuits filed by other American corn
growers alleging profit losses from the drop in corn prices after the
incident. 56

II. THE EUROPEAN UNION REGULATION: CLASSICAL EUROPEAN
In the E.U., the European Commission consolidated
regulatory decisions by specifically adopting Council Directive
90/220 ("Directive 90/220") to deal with the release of GMOs into
the European environment.57
According to the procedure of
Directive 90/220, approval of a GMO for release is required by all
the member states before it can proceed into the open market. 8
This approval process is true for GMOs created in the E.U. or
GMOs imported from other countries, primarily the U.S. 9
A.

The Directive: Council Directive 90/220/EEC

European Council Directive 90/22060 focuses on the "deliberate
release" of GMOs into the environment."1 Directive 90/220 "seeks
to provide a high level of protection throughout the community on
health, safety, environmental and consumer protection and to
ensure the safe development of industrial products utilizing
GMOs."62 Each member state is required to follow Directive
90/220 by appointing a competent authority and notifying this
authority about the research risks of GMOs. 3 The duties of the
55. See Mike Glover, Biotech Corn Deal Reached, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-

NEWS, Jan. 24, 2001 (reporting that Aventis agreed to settle the class action
lawsuit for an undisclosed amount estimated to be $100 million to $1 billion),
availableat 2001 WL 5228144.
56. See, e.g., Sutter v. Aventis Cropscience USA Holding, Inc., 145 F. Supp.
2d 1050, 1053-54 (S.D. Iowa. 2001); Dupraz v. Aventis Cropscience USA

Holding, Inc., 153 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1103 (D. S.D. 2001).
57. Endres, supra note 16, at 458-59; see also Julie Teel, Regulating
Genetically Modified Products and Processes: An Overview of Approaches, 8
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 649, 669 (2000). However, Directive 90/220 does not apply
to GMOs that have been developed through common techniques and have a

long safety record. Id.
58. See Nanda, supra note 18, at 255-59 (documenting the process and
steps necessary to reach approval of a GMO in the E.U.).
59. See Endres, supra note 16, at 459-60 (noting that this strict approval
process is causing a sharp decline in agricultural trade between the U.S. and

E.U.).
60. Council Directive 90/220 of 23 April 1990 on the Deliberate Release into
the Environment of Genetically Modified Organisms, 1990 O.J. (L117/15)
[hereinafter Directive 90/220].
61. Nanda, supra note 18, at 256.
62. Id.
63. Id. "Each member state is to designate the competent authority
responsible for the implementation of the Directive and to ensure that such
authority takes appropriate control measures for such implementation." Id.
"Before deliberately releasing a GMO for research purposes, the person
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competent authority include examining the notification,
evaluating the risks, and providing written consent as a
prerequisite for "deliberate release"' into the environment. 5
After a release is completed, the requestor sends the result of
the release (such as any potential risk to human health or the
The competent
environment) to the competent authority.66
authority must then send a report to the European Commission,
which forwards the report to other member states for their
approval or rejection of the GMOs' release into each of their
respective markets."
Despite this very restrained approach, according to Directive
90/220, no member state of the E.U. is to "prohibit, restrict or
impede the placing on the market of products containing, or
consisting of, GMOs which comply with the requirements of this
Directive."6 There have been several failed attempts by individual
member states to further toughen restrictions regarding the
release of GMOs, and to extend the reach of European regulations
concerning GMOs.69
B. E. U. PrecautionaryPrinciple
The driving force behind this strict approach is public distrust
of GMOs and public safety concerns."
The precautionary
proposing such release must notify the competent national authority within
the pertinent territory of the risks involved and the conditions and the
environment in which the release is to take place." Id. at 257. See also Teel,
supra note 57, at 669-70 (describing briefly the approval process under
Directive 90/220).
64. Article 2 of Council Directive 90/220 defines "deliberate release" as "any
intentional introduction into the environment of a GMO or a combination of
GMOs without provisions for containment such as physical barriers or a
combination of physical barriers together with chemical and/or biological
barriers used to limit their contact with the general population and the
environment." Directive 90/220. See also Julia Novotny, Genetically Modified
Organisms, 13 FLA. J. INT'L L. 231, 233 (2001) (noting that the term
"deliberate release" refers to the planned introduction of GMOs into the
general environment, but some scientists still fear the risk of an accidental
gene transfer to wild relatives).
65. Nanda, supra note 18, at 257.
66. Id. at 257; Council Directive 90/220, art. 8, 1990 O.J. (L117/15).
67. Nanda, supra note 18, at 257. The competent authorities send a
summary of every notification to the Commission, and the Commission
forwards these summaries to other member states. Id. The competent
authorities inform the other member states and the Commission of whether
the notification complies with this Directive 90/220. Id. If the release does not
meet Directive 90/220's conditions it may be rejected. Id.
68. Id. at 258. See also Council Directive 90/220, art. 15, 1990 O.J.
(L117/15).
69. Nanda, supra note 18, at 258-59.
70. See Endres, supra note 16, at 458 (noting that as a result of growing
public skepticism in Europe over possible GMO risks, the "European
Parliament's Committee on the Environment, Public Health, and Consumer
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principle's premise is to protect the public food supply from
potentially dangerous GMOs. 7'
Inherent in the precautionary
principle is that pro-active measures must be taken to reduce the
risk of uncertain scientific dangers in GMOs. 2 This principle is
strongly favored and supported by environmental groups73 and
stresses the difference in approaches to GMOs between the U.S.
and the E.U."4
The criticism of the precautionary principle is that in the last
decade, the E.U. has only approved fourteen GMOs for use in the
market place, while the U.S., Japan, and Canada approved
approximately one hundred GMOs for "general release." 5
Moreover, the E.U.'s overly cautious guiding principle has slowed
policy changes and, in turn, deterred scientific research."
In
addition, the precautionary principle
has
reduced
agricultural
77
trade between the U.S. and the E.U.

III. ANALYSIS: TWO SYSTEMS OUT OF TUNE
The relaxed U.S. and the restrictive E.U. GMO regulatory

Protection adopted a proposal advocating a 'safety first' principle").
71. Id. at 457-59.
72. See Deborah Katz, The Mismatch Between the Biosafety Protocol and
the PrecautionaryPrinciple, 13 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 949, 981-82 (2001)
(discussing the Biosafety Protocol and the Precautionary Principle and the
impact of the Precautionary Principle on transgenic plants).
73. The Sierra Club Genetic Engineering Committee Report (April 2000),
available at http: / / www.sierraclub.org/ biotech/report.asp (revised March
2001). Sierra Club's Genetic Engineering Committee strongly supports the
precautionary principle in relation to biotechnology and GMOs and recognizes
the flaws of the present risk assessment systems. Id. According to the
Wingspread Consensus Statement on the Precautionary Principle, Jan., 1998,
"[wihen an activity raises threats of harm to the environment or human
health, precautionary measures should be taken even if some cause and effect
relationships are not fully established scientifically." Id. The conference
participants addressed risk assessment as follows: "We believe existing
environmental regulations and other decisions, particularly those based on
risk assessment, have failed to protect adequately human health and the
environment, the larger system of which humans are but a part." Id. The
precautionary principle is primarily important for GMOs, because these
technologies are so new and untested that the potential harm could be
irreversible. Id. Once a GMO is released into the environment, it is
impossible to recall the GMO. Id.
74. See Henrique Freire de Oliveira Souza, Genetically Modified Plants: A
Need for InternationalRegulation, 6 ANN. SURV. INT'L & COMP. L. 129, 141-74
(2000) (discussing the commercialized regulatory battle between the U.S. and
E.U. and urging uniform international regulation).
75. Endres, supra note 16, at 469-70.
76. See Kupchella, supra note 47, at 733 (noting that "[tihe EU has been
extremely slow to match scientific advances with the necessary related policy
and regulatory adjustments.").
77. See Endres, supra note 16, at 460 (noting that "E.U. restrictions on
genetically modified corn cost U.S. farmers $200 million in sales in 1998").
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systems have left the global GMO regulatory system in disarray.
Part A discusses the benefits and disadvantages of the U.S.'s
laissez-faire attitude towards approval of GMOs. Similarly, Part
B evaluates the benefits and disadvantages of the more
precautionary approach to GMO regulation that the E.U. adopted.
Part C discusses how the adoption of these systems, or variations
on these systems, has had a splintering effect on GMO regulation
throughout the world. Finally, Part D demonstrates how the
fractured regulatory schemes are affecting the international trade
of GMO products, the continued research of GMO products, and
the unfortunate effect this is having on developing countries.
A. Critiquingthe U.S. System
1.

Benefits

The crux of the U.S. regulatory system is rooted in economic
and business principles that focus mainly on profit."8 The most
beneficial aspect of the U.S. regulatory system is the liberal
approval of GMOs.7 9 Because corporations in the U.S. are heavily
involved in the research and development of GMOs, they receive
the most benefit in getting GMO approval." In addition, the U.S.
government has an interest in assisting GMO technology because
it has invested billions of governmental dollars into these
projects.8'
Easy approval leads to increased profits for
corporations, and, in turn, funds future research and development
projects for GMO products. Better GMOs will help increase crop
yields, reduce pesticide use, and feed more people, which will aid
U.S. trade."
As GMOs are introduced into the agricultural

78. See Lee Egerstrom, Scientists' Debate Over Altered Crops Leaves Many
Waiting for Evidence, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Feb. 20, 2000 (noting that the

U.S. financial markets have accepted biotechnology for its potential to create
profitable GMO products), available at 2000 WL 14920878.

79. Kim, supra note 20, at 1179-82. From the time the U.S. Framework
was instituted in 1986 to September 1991, APHIS had approved 181 permits
for small-scale trial tests for genetically modified plants. Id. See also Marc
Victor, Precautionor Protectionism? The PrecautionaryPrinciple, Genetically
Modified Organisms, and Allowing Unfounded Fearto UndermineFree Trade,
14 TRANSNAT'L LAw. 295, 296 (2001) (recognizing that the USDA has approved

fifty GMO plant varieties, but that the E.U. has only approved eighteen GMOs
in the same amount of time).
80. See Egerstrom, supra note 78 (stating that multinational corporations

have spent over $100 billion consolidating seed genetic companies and
technology to lead the biotechnology race because of the potential for
extremely profitable GMO products).
81. See Novotny, supra note 64, at 232 (noting that the U.S. government
has invested over $3.4 billion in supporting GMO research projects).
82. Id. at 231. Biotechnology has already proven its efficiency by increasing
crop yields and reducing the use of pesticides because some genetically
modified plants can ward off pests on their own. Id. at 231-32.
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system, the products increase efficiency and output, which help
improve trade exports.'
2. Disadvantages
The main disadvantage of the U.S. regulatory system is the
multi-agency approach and the confusion this divided system
creates. Instead of meeting the regulatory agenda proscribed by
each agency's statute, each agency has fallen short in some way.
First, the FDA's statutory concern for comprehensive food safety8,
is not being met, as witnessed by the recent StarLink Corn
incident. 5 Second, the EPA must determine whether the GMO
will have an "unreasonable adverse effect" on the environment."
However, it is often impossible to determine the environmental
contamination until after the product's release into the
environment.8 ' Finally, the USDA's objective is to regulate the
release of GMOs in agriculture biotechnology research; however,
StarLink Corn proved that even limited agency approval' is not
necessarily appropriate for the release of every GMO product.
Moreover, having a multi-agency approval system is an
inefficient use of agency resources." The intricacy of the system
creates gaps in the approval process because certain products
do
not require approval from each agency or any agency. 90 Overall,
83. The U.S. is the world leader in GMOs. Endres, supra note 16, at 459.
The U.S. government's Trade Commission believes that soon 100% of U.S.
agricultural exports will be GMO products, or at least mixed with GMO
products. Id. at 459-60.
84. Kim, supra note 20, at 1181.
85. See Goodman, supra note 11 (discussing the regulatory agency
embarrassment and huge monetary loss involved with the StarLink Corn
incident).

86. Kim, supra note 20, at 1181.
87. Novotny, supra note 64, at 233. Since the impact of GMO food products
is uncertain, both Frito Lay, a large corn snack producer, and Seagram, a
large distiller, have informed their suppliers they will not purchase genetically
modified corn this year. Id. Additionally, it is feared that genetically modified
crops could have unforeseen environmental consequences. Id. Scientists are
unsure if genetically modified plants will crossbreed with other wild relatives
and spread their genetic material uncontrollably through the environment.
Id. Corn genetically modified to resist pests has already indiscriminately
killed a non-targeted insect. Id. Pollen from the corn drifted onto milkweed
plants and killed monarch butterflies that commonly feed on the milkweed
plant. Id.
88. See Goodman, supra note 11 (explaining that StarLink Corn was
specifically approved only for animal consumption, even without evidence of
human allergic reactions to the Cry9c protein).
89. Novotny, supra note 64, at 236. Since each of the three agencies have
jurisdiction over the same regulatory provisions, there is an inefficient
overlap. Id.
90. Nanda, supra note 18, at 243-46. A company may not have to receive
approval from the EPA if the GMO does not have a pesticide-like quality or is
not toxic. Id. at 244. The USDA does not have to approve a product if it
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the benefits of liberal approval and expanded trade of the U.S.
regulatory system are outweighed by the flaws in the system.
B. Critiquingthe E.U. System
1. Benefits
The main focus behind the E.U. regulatory system is the
precautionary principle, which stresses concern for public safety
and the environment."' Since consumers dictate the market
response to GMOs, knowing that food safety is the major consumer
concern allows businesses to assess which GMOs they should
attempt to get approved.
Placing regulatory approval under one governing body
eliminates the confusion and inefficiency92 of the fragmented U.S.
system. The E.U. recognized that using pre-existing statutes to
regulate GMOs would be inadequate, so it recently created and
amended Directive 90/220 to have the ability to adapt to new GMO
products very quickly. 93 Additionally, having one governing body
creates a uniform approval standard for each of the member states
Moreover, consolidating regulation into one
in the E.U.9
governing agency with one governing statute allows for efficient
guideline approval and distribution. 9

determines the GMO falls under "non-regulated status," meaning it is not a
plant pest. Id. at 245. Finally, the FDA does not have to approve a GMO if it
is considered GRAS, meaning it is sufficiently similar to regular foods. Id. at
245-46.
91. Id. at 256. See also Victor, supra note 79, at 315 (noting the original
purpose of the "precautionary principle" was to control pollution and to protect
public health and the environment).
92. Novotny, supra note 64, at 236. Centralizing biotechnology regulation
into one agency could increase efficiency because the agency could focus
specifically on biotechnology issues and would become experts in biotechnology
regulation. Id.
93. Kim, supra note 20, at 1193-94. The E.U. recognized that older
environmental regulations were inadequate to address the environmental
risks associated with GMOs. Id. at 1194. -Therefore, the E.U. avoided
adapting its pre-existing regulations to approve GMOs by choosing a processoriented approach that targets biotechnology techniques specifically. Id. at
1193-94.
Directive 90/220 provides a comprehensive legal
94. Id. at 1199.
framework for all phases of GMO product release. Id. In addition, the E.U.
has implemented a system that encompasses several nations into one system,
even though its member states have a wide range of regulatory systems. Id.
Moreover, despite the problems with Directive 90/220, it has been the most
comprehensive, multi-national approach to harmonization of international
GMO regulation to date. Id.
95. Id. at 1190-91. Directive 90/220 sets minimum standards that every

member state must follow in approving GMO products, although the
individual states enact their own laws incorporating the Directive. Id. at
1191. In addition, the European Commission schedules regular meetings

20021

Biotechnology ThroughUniform Regulation

2. Disadvantages
The problem with a precautionary approach to GMO approval
is that the process is too arduous, even for the E.U. member states
that must adhere to the precautionary principle and Directive
90/220. 96 Additionally, the precautionary principle and Directive
90/220 are not being uniformly adapted throughout all of the E.U.
member states. 97
The denial of outside GMO products severely reduces and
restricts trade between the E.U. and countries that use GMO crops
extensively, most notably the U.S.9" Under Directive 90/220, an
individual E.U. member state can further restrict GMO products if
the member state believes there is a "justifiable reason" based on
potential risks to human health or the environment.99 A few
member states exercised the right to restrict GMO product
importation into their countries. 100
One member state's
government used political pressure in an attempt to shut down
any research of GMOs within its borders.'
This excessive

between the member states to exchange information regarding GMOs. Id. at
1193.
96. Novotny, supra note 64, at 234-35. The drawback to the processoriented approach is that it takes too long for approval and slows research. Id.
234-35. For example, a recent GMO petunia project was abandoned in
Germany because the local town filed 16,000 complaints pursuant to Directive
90/220. Id. at 235.
97. Jeffrey K. Francer, FrankensteinFoods or Flavor Savers?: Regulating
AgriculturalBiotechnology in the Untied States and European Union, 7 VA. J.
SOC. POLY & L. 257, 287 (2000). Directive 90/220 requires that each
individual member state draft its own implementing provisions for GMOs. Id.

However, because of Directive 90/220's lack of detail, individual members are
creating their own data and risk assessment factors for GMOs. Id.
98. See Victor, supra note 79, at 321 (noting that the precautionary
principle reduces global free trade and has come into severe conflict with
international trade law).
99. Council Directive 90/220, art. 16, 1990 O.J. (L117/15). Victor, supra
note 79, at 302. If an E.U. member state believes it has a justifiable reason,
the European Commission must still decide whether to approve that member
state's provisional restriction argument. Id. The Commission has three
months to decide and uses the same guidelines as it would to determine initial
notification of a GMO. Id. However, if the Commission fails to reach a
decision it will be considered an approval of the provisional restriction. Id.
100. Victor, supra note 79, at 303-04. France, Austria, and Luxembourg
have each received provisional restrictions on the future importation of GMO
products into their countries. Id. at 303. Furthermore, the European
Commission Regulation Committee has not issued an opinion verifying or
nullifying the alleged justifiable reason. Id. at 303-04. Because the
Regulation Committee has not acted, the restrictions are still legally valid. Id.
at 304.
101. Drew L. Kershen, Essay: The Risks of Going Non-GMO, 53 OKLA. L.
REV. 631, 648 (2000). Italy's Green Party has been campaigning against the
use of modern genetic science and research in agriculture. Id. The current
Agriculture Minister is attempting to foreclose all research that includes
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restriction will deter companies from researching what the
uniformed or non-scientific1 0 2 public deems controversial.
Companies may doubt they could attain approval in the E.U.
C. The Regulatory Effect in the World: Marchingto Their Own
Drummer
The gaps, inconsistencies, and disadvantages of the two
opposite approaches to regulation have led to fractured regulatory
schemes throughout the world. A few countries, fearing lost
profits from large corporate research, have refused to regulate
GMOs. O' Those countries have sacrificed the unknown potential
environmental and health risks"M of GMO food products to gain
the economic benefits of big business.'
This lack of concern shows
just how shortsighted a governing body can be when faced with the
potential economic benefits that accompany GMOs.
Countries, like the U.S., that have concerns about GMO food
product effects and public safety have taken a more moderate
approach."'
Most of these moderate approach countries have
adopted voluntary guidelines. ' A country will send regulatory
representatives to study the U.S. regulatory system and determine
which aspects should be implemented. 0
Additionally, a few
countries have decided to directly exchange information about the
U.S. regulatory scheme to create their own system.' °9 Though
these countries are more protective than countries that refuse to
regulate GMOs, this approach still leaves too much uncertainty
and inefficiency.
Moreover, it adds even more conflicts and
disorganization into the international biotechnology regulatory
GMOs anywhere in Italy. Id. This could cause Italian agriculture to lag
behind other developed countries in the biotechnology sciences. Id. at 649.
102. Id. at 644. The risk of scientific ignorance is that lay people can force
their government to use the "precautionary principle" as a preventative
principle because they do not take into account the overwhelming scientific
evidence that current GMO food products are safe for human consumption.
Id. at 645. Even the Irish government has acknowledged the appropriate
scientific understanding regarding agricultural biotechnology. Id. The author
notes, "[i]f society is driven by fears or ideologies, it can quickly degenerate
into quackery or worse." Id. at 648.
103. Kim, supra note 20, at 1196.

104. Francer, supra note 97, at 290. There is some fear among scientists
that genetically altered plants could have unexpected adverse health effects on
humans. Id. at 291. Scientists have proven that some genetically modified
plants could retain their allergenic traits, which could affect sensitive
members of the population. Id. at 292. In addition, there is a possibility that
genetically modified food products containing certain antibiotic genetic
material could cause antibiotic resistance among some humans. Id. at 293.
105. Kim, supra note 20, at 1183.

106.
107.
108.
109.

Id.
Id. at 1183-84.
Id.
Id. at 1184.
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field. 110
Conversely, the E.U.'s excessive concern about public safety
has kept their regulatory scheme deeply entrenched within the
Their paternalistic" 2 attitude may
precautionary principle."'
appease the average consumer by being overprotective, but they
are receiving complaints from member states, which are trying to
approve new GMO products, that Directive 90/220 is too strict."3
In effect, the E.U. approach hampers GMO research and
development and deters companies from seeking biotechnology
approval within its borders.
D. Sour Notes: InternationalDisharmony
Several scholars and commentators have called for
international harmonization of regulatory systems, but there have
With so many
been few remedies to address the problem."'
different regulatory approaches regarding GMOs, a business that
seeks to release a GMO product must qualify under all individual
Inefficient and divergent regulatory plans
nations' laws."'
increase the cost of an already expensive regulatory compliance
process."' This added expense becomes even more of a deterrent
110. Kim, supra note 20, at 1196. See also Victor, supra note 79, at 309
(noting the previous regulatory conflict between the U.S. and E.U. regulatory
approaches of genetically altered beef hormones).
111. Victor, supra note 79, at 304. On June 25, 1999, the European
Commission recommended that Directive 90/220 be amended to include a
precautionary approach requiring positive proof that a GMO would have no
affect on public safety or the environment, without which there would be no
authorization. Id. Each E.U. member state agreed, and a GMO moratorium
ensued. Id. The U.S. accused the E.U. of using the food safety claim as a
guise to restrict GMO imports. Id. at 296-97.
112. Sidney A. Shapiro & Thomas 0. McGarity, Not So Paradoxical:The
Rationale for Technology-Based Regulation, 1991 DUKE L.J. 729, 730 (1991)
(noting a recent speaker's opinion was that in a broad conservative view,
almost all government regulation is paternalistic, but especially so in the
technology-based regulatory field).
113. See Victor, supra note 79, at 304 (noting that despite the recent
moratorium on GMO approval, seven E.U. member states are still asking for
approval of new GMO products).
114. Kim, supra note 20, at 1195. There is an immediate need to harmonize
international GMO regulations because of the risk of deliberate release of
GMOs into the environment. Id. Once released, these GMOs could quickly
"transcend political boundaries" and spread unchecked across geographic
regions. Id. Harmonizing regulatory schemes will avoid the problems
associated with widely disparate regulations. Id. at 1200. Harmonization will
also develop an international consensus regarding the safe release of GMOs
based upon protection of human health and the environment. Id. See also
Souza, supra note 74, at 160 (noting that the two most important economies,
the U.S. and E.U., are on opposite sides of the GMO debate and that this lack
of clear regulation requires harmonization).
115. Kim, supra note 20, at 1196.
116. Id.
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when coupled with the expensive research and development
process."7 Increasing the cost of regulatory compliance may cause
businesses to either forego product introduction in a particularly
strict regulatory nation,"" or perhaps abandon some GMO
products completely." 9 In effect, this added regulatory approval
cost could become a major factor when a corporation decides on
new GMO product research.
There is also the possibility that countries could use strict
regulatory systems as a means to severely restrict the foreign
importation of GMO products. 2' Any country that wishes to
export GMO products to other markets must adhere to the strict
safety regulations of the potential importing nationI' or risk being
excluded from that market altogether. In essence, a country
employing a strict regulatory system could force its economy to
restrict unwelcome foreign competitors 122 and monopolize its
domestic GMO product market.
Furthermore, a corporation that is barred from competitive
alternatives in a strict regulatory country will look to countries
that have less strict regulations as their most profitable
markets. 12
The most likely choice for such international
companies is to turn to underdeveloped countries that have less
severe regulatory schemes, or possibly no regulatory scheme at
all."' Without a proper regulatory system to monitor the potential
human and environmental risks associated with GMOs,
multinational corporations will easily exploit the developing
world."2
Just as American federal jurisprudence seeks to avoid "forum

117. Id.
118. Id.

119. Francer, supra note 97, at 292. Pioneer Hi-Bred International
developed a soybean plant to be used in animal feed, which was infused with a
Brazil-nut protein. Id. During safety testing, the company discovered that
the Brazil nut protein retained its human allergenic qualities and was being
expressed in the new genetically modified soybean plant. Id. Pioneer
voluntarily refrained from marketing this new product because of the
possibility that it could be mistakenly mixed with human food sources. Id.
120. Kim, supra note 20, at 1196.

121. Id.
122. Id. See also Kershen, supra note 101, at 645 (observing the public could
force the government to use the "precautionary principle" as a preventative

principle to keep out GMO products).
123. Kim, supra note 20, at 1197.

124. Id.
125. See Kim, supra note 20, at 1196 (noting that South Korea and Taiwan

both specifically refuse to adopt regulatory schemes to court corporate
investing and encourage economic growth).
126. Id. at 1197. See also Novotny, supra note 64, at 236 (observing that

some developing countries are being used as test sites for researchers in an
attempt to avoid countries with stricter regulatory schemes).
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shopping,"127 international regulatory schemes
should be
structured to avoid "regulation shopping" in the developing
world."2 Until there is international harmony of GMO regulatory
schemes, there will continue to be gaps and inconsistencies that
will create a cacophony of multinational corporations' regulatory
loopholes avoiding restrictive GMO research countries or relaxed
risk assessment guidelines.
IV. SWEET REGULATORY Music: BLENDING LAX CAPITALISM WITH
CLASSICAL EUROPEAN
Creating a hybrid regulatory system composed of the most
beneficial aspects of both the U.S. and E.U. approaches would
provide a model international scheme that developing countries
could adopt. Specifically, developing countries could use the
genetically modified "golden rice" to help combat the vitamin A
malnutrition epidemic.
In addition, these two international
leaders in GMO regulation could take special note of this hybrid
approach in an attempt to bring both systems closer to a globally
harmonized system.
A. The Hybrid InternationalRegulatory System
To create this hybrid regulatory scheme, it is important to
capitalize on the pros of the U.S. and E.U. systems, while at the
same time avoiding the pitfalls of each system. While providing
consistency, this new system must have some flexibility, allowing
each developing country to meet its malnourished childrens' needs.
The ideal hybrid system would have one regulatory agency
that controls all aspects of GMO testing, release, and market
approval. A unified body, like the E.U. model, would avoid the
inefficiencies that plague the multi-agency system in the U.S.
The single agency would create new regulations that deal

127. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 82 (1938) (noting that one of

the principles directing the opinion was to discourage potential litigants from
"forum shopping" in the federal court system hoping for more beneficial

judgments). Multinational corporations' direct influence on biotechnology
makes less-stringent regulatory countries more tempting as primary areas to
conduct

GMO

field-testing

and

marketing.

Thomas

0.

McGarity,

InternationalRegulation of DeliberateRelease Biotechnologies, 26 TEX. INT'L
L.J. 423, 435 (1991). Some corporations have proposed that approach. Id. at
436. This particular hazard was demonstrated when Argentine workers
tested positive for antibodies found in a genetically modified vaccine for cattle.
Id. 436-37. The workers had been exposed to the vaccine by drinking milk
from the inoculated cattle. Id. at 437. Argentina did not have a regulatory
scheme in place to deal with GMOs at the time, and did not receive
notification from Wistar, the company conducting the tests. Id. at 436.
128. See Novotny, supra note 64, at 235 (noting that a scientist or researcher
faced with strict, process-oriented regulations would most likely be drawn to

countries with less imposing restrictions).
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specifically with GMOs. It would also promulgate guidelines to
assist companies seeking GMO approval.
Like the FDA,
genetically modified foods that are "generally recognized as safe"
(GRAS),12 9 or can be considered a "substantial equivalent" 13 to
their natural counterpart, would be approved without extraneous
testing. The main focus of either of these tests would be to
determine how similar the genetically modified food product is to
the conventional precursor. Depending on the test results,' 3' any
approved genetically modified food product could then be released
into the open market.
Additionally, unlike the E.U. system, this agency could make
pre-market review optional instead of mandatory. 32 If there is a
reasonable belief by the agency to require a pre-market review, it
should ask the company seeking approval for a risk assessment
before the GMO could be approved. This would provide the hybrid
system a way to avoid the arduous approval process stifling the
E.U. regulatory system.
Sound scientific principles must underlie the entire hybrid
regulatory approval system. The main focus for this requirement
is to avoid the problems faced by the E.U. system's precautionary
principle. However, weighing the scientific principles against
other competing social, environmental, and economic interests
should effectively assure consumer safety. This hybrid system

129. See generally 21 U.S.C. § 321 (2002) (stating that if the particular
characteristic of the genetically modified food product is not generally
recognized as safe (GRAS), according to qualified scientific experts, then that
determination will affect the approval process).
130. David L. Devernoe, Note,
Substantial Equivalence: A Valid
International Sanitary and Phytosanitary Risk Assessment Objective for
Genetically Modified Foods, 51 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 257, 277 (2000). The

substantial equivalence compares the genetically modified food product with
the non-genetically modified parental variety, also called the conventional
precursor. Id. at 278. It uses multiple factors including nutritional,
toxicological, immunological, and pathogenic criteria in the comparison. Id.

This standard "is not a safety assessment in itself[,]" but it does provide
genetically modified food regulators with guidelines directed at food safety.
Id.
131. Id. at 279. There are three possible endpoints in a substantial
equivalence analysis: (1) the genetically modified food product is substantially
equivalent to its conventional precursor; (2) the genetically modified food
product, though not determined as substantially equivalent, could still be
determined as substantially equivalent because of particular differences; or (3)
the genetically modified food product's substantial equivalence is
unascertainable either because the differences are ambiguous or because no
conventional precursor exists. Id. If the analysis ends with either of the last
two conclusions, more testing will be necessary, which will be done on a caseby-case basis. Id.
132. See Francer, supra note 97, at 279 (observing that mandatory premarket approval is the "centerpiece of Directive 90/220's" regulatory scheme

for the deliberate release of GMOs into the E.U. environment).
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should still allow liberal approval, discourage regulatory "forum
shopping," and provide consumers with a sense of confidence in
their regulatory system.
On an international level, the hybrid system could be
monitored by the World Trade Organization ("WTO") because it is
the main forum to settle agricultural trade disputes.'
Since the
WTO already handles trade disputes related to GMOs,"M it could
also monitor trade disputes that arise from the adoption of this
hybrid GMO regulatory system. As more nations adopted this
approach, the global regulatory system would begin to blend and
harmonize.'
No one country would become a trade barrier to any
other country, and international trade would flourish.3 6 As a
result, the hybrid system would create a free flow of genetically
modified products across national boundaries.'37
Additionally, multinational corporations would stop exploiting
less regulated countries."1
As regulatory schemes begin to
harmonize, approval costs would become internationally
consistent. Corporations doing GMO research could factor that
expense as a constant in determining overall expenses for GMO

133. Teel, supra note 57, at 683. The two agreements that involve GMOs are
the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade and the Agreement on the
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures ("SPS"). Id. Although it
is unclear which of these provisions controls the GMO debate, at least one, if
not both, should address the issue. Id. at 683-84. The WTO does not set
international standards for sanitary and phytosanitary protections mentioned
in the SPS. Id. at 693. However, those standards are set by three
international organizations mentioned by the SPS Agreement: 1) the Codex
Alimentarius Commission; 2) the International Office of Epizootics; and 3) the
International Plant Protection Convention. Id.
134. Id. at 694-97 (discussing Beef-Hormone dispute settlement process
between the U.S. and the E.U.).
135. Kim, supra note 20, at 1200. Harmonizing international regulations for
the deliberate releases of GMOs can solve the problem of disparate regulations
in individual nations. Id. Harmonization allows all nations to develop safe
biotechnology according to a common goal for protection of health and
environment. Id.
136. Id. Harmonization promotes economic development and reduces
national trade barriers regarding GMOs. Id.
In addition, uniform
international standards would reduce trade barriers by making GMO products
more readily available to consumers in all nations. Id.
137. Id. This international GMO regulation uniformity also helps the
development of international markets, by making it the most attractive option
for multinational corporations attempting to market biotechnology products,
instead of forum shopping. Id.
138. Id. Developing nations that do not have resources to develop their own
regulatory body because of expense can also benefit from uniform
international regulations. Id. at 1200-01. The poorest developing nations
could rely on risk assessments from one international governing body (for
example the WTO), instead of any other nation. Id. at 1201. This would
protect developing countries that do not have qualified scientific experts
skilled in the assessment of GMOs. Id.
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approval. 9
This would hopefully dissuade corporations from
cutting safety corners merely to save money on approval. Since
the hybrid system would remove the regulatory gaps,
international trade of GMOs could maintain safety while still
being economically beneficial.
B. Example: Golden Rice
One can test this proposed hybrid system using "golden rice"
as an example. Hypothetically, a developing nation that adopts
this hybrid scheme could evaluate the risk of this "golden rice"
using the multi-factor analysis discussed above. Under either the
GRAS test or the "substantial equivalence" test, the vitamin A
fortified rice would be compared to its naturally occurring parent
variety of rice. If either test determines that "golden rice" is
similar enough to the conventional precursor, then the nation's
regulatory agency could approve the product for deliberate release
into the environment.
Consequently, domestic producers could begin growing
"golden Rice" or importing "golden Rice" from another country.
For developing countries that use rice as a dietary staple and face
vitamin A deficiency, this GMO approval process creates a proper
risk assessment tool that helps solve an epidemic malnutrition
problem. The built-in safety guidelines of the hybrid system could
adequately protect humans and the environment; while at the
same time allow the timely approval of genetically modified food
products that address current social needs.
C. Revising the U.S. and E. U. Regulatory Approaches
The hybrid system does sound ideal, but it will be met with
opposition from many sources, much like GMOs have been met
with opposition.
The U.S. regulators, E.U. regulators,
environmentalists, and consumer groups will all have reservations
to the hybrid regulatory system. The first step is for the world's
two largest economies, the U.S. and E.U., to begin harmonizing
their own regulatory systems.
Since the U.S. and E.U. are so deeply entrenched in their
regulatory systems, immediate change may not be feasible for
either one. However, there are certain characteristics of the
hybrid approach that each system could implement.
By
continually shifting toward one common system, the U.S. and E.U.
could significantly aid the international harmonization of GMO
regulations.
First, the U.S. should streamline GMO regulation by
139. See id. at 1200 (noting the GMO industry would be better served if
multinational corporations producing GMOs only have to comply with a single
set of uniform regulations).
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incorporating it into one regulatory agency, whether in a new
agency or an existing regulatory agency. " ' This would be the first
step in curing the gaps, overlaps, and inconsistencies that cause
the U.S. regulatory system so many problems.
Meanwhile, the E.U. must reduce its reliance on the
precautionary principle, and instead use other means to address
consumer food safety. The precautionary principle does not
effectively meet the regulatory needs of E.U. consumers and has
Instead of maintaining this overbeen heavily criticized.'
protectionist principle, it is possible for the E.U. to adopt a
"substantial equivalence" test for GMO approval. If the E.U.
decides this test does not adequately address food safety, it can
require additional scientific proof regarding GMOs that are
allergenic or potentially toxic. Adopting this system would bring
the E.U. closer to global harmony, while still adequately protecting
humans and the environment.

V. A REGULATORY JAM SESSION
Developing countries can meet the humanitarian goal to end
vitamin A deficiency by using GMO products such as "golden rice."
However, the effort to prevent blindness in young children begins
with a better GMO regulatory system. A hybrid regulatory
approach would help developing countries reap the benefits of
GMO products, while still protecting consumers and the
environment. While neither the U.S. nor the E.U. will be prepared
to completely dismantle their GMO regulations, each side must
140. Richard A. Merril & Jeffrey K. Francer, OrganizingFederalFood Safety
Regulation, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 61, 115 (2000). There have been wide
ranging proposals to consolidate all federal food safety functions under one

agency. Id. At one end are advocates who would place all food safety
regulations under the USDA, while at the other end are advocates who would
Id. During the Clinton
place all of these duties under the FDA.
Administration's National Performance Review, it was found that at least
twenty-one agencies were involved in food safety research, which created too
many "bureaucratic cracks" and lacked inter-agency cooperation. Id. at 121.
Subsequently, a 1998 report by the National Academy of Sciences urged
Congress to restructure food safety regulations under one uniform framework.
Id. at 123.
141. Jonathan H. Adler, More Sorry than Safe: Assessing the Precautionary
Principle and the ProposedInternationalBiosafety Protocol, 35 TEX. INT'L L.J.

173, 196 (2000). The precautionary principle's mantra, "it is better to be safe
than sorry," biases a regulatory agency against the introduction of any new
technology. Id. The precautionary principle "turns a blind eye" toward harms
that restraining technological development causes. Id. Comparing it to the
FDA's "drug lag," it has the same effect that those waiting for the benefit may
be harmed waiting for excessively "safe" regulatory approval.

Id.

See also

Katz, supra note 72, at 965 (noting that the precautionary principle itself
provides its own risks, which include avoiding technology based on fear even
though the risk is unrealized and creating a chilling effect on research and
development).
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continually focus on the scientific evidence and the social, ethical,
and moral aspects behind GMOs. If the E.U. and U.S. come closer
to a hybrid regulatory approach, the global community could
realize the full benefits of GMO regulatory harmony, and possibly
save many of those children waiting in lines.

